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[So F. No. 18818. In Bank. Oct. 23, 1953.] 
GINO GUIDI, Appellant, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
et al., Respondents. 
[1] State of California-Tort Liability.-The state and its instru-
mentalities and subdivisions are not immune from liability for 
torts committed while engaged in proprietary or business 
activities. (Gov. Code, § 16041.) 
[2] Id.-Tort Liability.-Governmental immunity from liability 
for torts tUrns on nature of particular activity that leads to 
plaintiff's injury, not on identity of governmental subdivision 
or agency carrying on activity or on fact that the facility in 
question may also be used for governmental purposes. 
[3] Id.-Tort Liability.-In action against state and State Agri-
cultural Society for injuries sustained by patron at state fair 
when he was knocked down and trampled on by a horse which 
had been frightened by fireworks exhibition, reviewing court 
is not concerned with possible immunity of state from liability 
for negligence in connection with agricultural and educational 
activities at fair, but only with sta.te's claim of immunity for 
negligence in course of setting off fireworks and maintaining 
horse arena. (Disapproving Dillwood v. Biecks, 42 Cal.App. 
602, 184 P. 35, insofar as it holds that counties may act only 
in a governmental capacity.) 
[4] Id.-Tort Liability.-The state is acting in a proprietary 
capacity when it enters into activities at state fair to amuse 
and entertain the public, such as maintenance of a horse arena 
and exhibition of fireworks, and neither '"it nor State Agricul-
tural Society is immune from liability for injuries sustainc(l 
by patron at fair when he was knocked down and trampled 
on by a horse which had been frightened by fireworks exhibi-
tion; hence it is error for trial court to conclude that consent 
statute does not allow maintenan~e of action for damages for 
[1] See Cal.Jur., State of California, § 37 et seq.; Am.Jur., States, 
Territories and Dependencies, §§ 73, 75 et seq. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-4] State of California, § 57. 
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luch injuries. (Disapproving MeZvin v. State, 121 Cal. 16, 
22, 53 P. 416, indicating that State Agricultural Society en-
gages in governmental activities only in conducting state fair.) 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. William T. Sweigert, 
Judge. Reversed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained by 
patron at state fair. Judgment for defendants reversed . 
. Remington Low, Clarence B. Knight and Sydney F. De-
Goff for Appellant. 
Dana, Bledsoe & Smith and Joseph W. Rogers, Jr., for 
Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J .-Plaintiff Gino Guidi brought this aetion 
against the State of California, the State Agricultural Society, 
and several individual defendants, to recover damages for per-
sonal injuries sustained at the state fairgrounds in Sacra-
mento. The trial court granted the motion of the state and 
the society for judgment on the pleadings, on the ground 
that the state fair is operated in the state's governmental 
capacity and that the state and society are therefore immune 
from suit. Plaintiff appeals from the ensuing judgment in 
favor of the state and the society.- We have concluded that 
the defense of governmental immunity from liability for tort 
is not available to the state and the society, and that the judg-
ment must therefore be reversed. 
Plaintiff alleged in his complaint: Defendant State Agri-
cultural Society plans, holds, and controls the state fair at 
Sacramento. At all relevant times, defendant Golden State 
Fire Works Company was the servant, agent, and employee 
of defendant State of California, and defendant Douglas 
Robb was the servant, agent, and employee of defendants 
L. D. Lockwood and Jane Doe Lockwood. On September 3, 
1950, plaintiff paid for his admission to the state fair and 
entered the fairgrounds. The accident occurred while he was 
·The record doel not reveal the present statUI of plaiDtiff'l action 
againlt the other defendants. The judgment m favor of the State of 
California and the State Agricultural Society is :final as to them, how· 
ever, and il appealable whether or not the aetion agamst the other de-
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standing near the entrance to the horse show arena. In his 
first cause of action, he alleges that defendants State of Cali-
fornia, State Agricultural Society, and Golden State Fire 
Works Company "so carelessly and negligently controlled, 
operated, supervised and maintained the said fairgrounds and 
the fire works exhibition at said Fair" that a certain horse, 
"Murietta Surprise," owned by defendants L. D. Lockwood 
and Jane Doe Lockwood, "became frightened and was caused 
to, and it did, run into, knock down and trample the plain-
tiff," causing severe personal injuries. The second cause of 
action follows the allegations of the first cause of action, and 
alleges in addition that defendants State of California and 
State Agricultural Society "carelessly and negligently failed 
to maintain the safeguards to protect the public, including 
the plaintiff, from the animals stabled, exercised, led and 
ridden" in the vicinity of the horse arena, so that "Murietta 
Surprise" was permitted and allowed to knock down and 
trample plaintiff. The third cause of action follows the 
allegations of the first cause of action, and alleges in addi-
tion that defendants L. D. Lockwood, Jane Doe Lockwood, 
and Douglas Robb "so carelessly and negligently controlled 
and maintained" the horse that it became frightened and 
was caused and permitted to run into and trample plaintiff. 
Plaintiff alleged compliance with the claim statute. (Gov. 
Code, § 16044.) 
[1] The state and its instrumentalities and subdivisions 
are not immune from liability for torts committed while en-
gaged in proprietary or business 'activities, (Gov. Code, 
§ 16041; People v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.2d 754, 761-762 
[178 P.2d 1] ; Muses v. Housing Authority, 83 Cal.App.2d 
489, 502 [189 P.2d 305].) In the present case, it appears 
from the complaint that one or both of two activities conducted 
by the state or its agents led to plaintiff's injuries: the 
exhibition of fireworks and the maintenance of the horse 
arena. The only question to be determined on this appeal is 
whether as a matter of law such activities are governmental. 
Defendants contend that the state fair is organized and 
operated solely to interest and educate the general public 
in agricultural and industrial subjects, a governmental 
activity, and that the maintenance of the horse arena and 
exhibition of the fireworks are likewise governmental activi-
ties since they are connected with the operation of the fair. 
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of the particular activity that leads to the plaintiff's injury, 
not on the identity of the governmental subdivision or agency 
carrying on the activity, or on the fact that the facility in 
question may also be used for governmental purposes. (Chafor 
v. City of Long Beach, 174 Cal. 478, 488 [163 P. 670, Ann. 
Cas. 1918D 106, L.R.A. 1917E 685] ; Rhodes v. City of Palo 
Alto, 100 Cal.App.2d 336, 341 [223 P.2d 639]; Boothby v. 
Town of Yreka City, 117 Cal.App. 643, 651 [4 P.2d 589]; 
Bertiz v. City of Los Angeles, 74 Cal.App. 792, 797 [241 P. 
921].) Thus, in PeopZe v. 8uperior Court, supra, 29 Cal.2d 
754, we held that the State Belt Railroad was operated by the 
State Harbor Commission in a proprietary capacity, although 
that agency prevented and extinguished fires on the water-
front in its governmental capacity. (29 Cal.2d at 760.) 
[3] Similarly, in the present case we are not concerned 
with the possible immunity of the state from liability for 
negligence in connection with agricultural and educational 
activities at the state fair, but only with its claim of immunity 
for negligence in the course of setting off fireworks and main· 
taining the horse arena. 
Most of the decisions relied upon by defendants are fac-
tually dissimilar to the present case. Two decisions, how-
ever, require discussion. In Melvin v. 8tate (1898),121 Cal. 
16 [53 P. 416], a spectator at a horse race at the state fair in 
Sacramento was injured by the collapse of the grandstand 
owing to the negligent maintenance thereof by the State 
Agricultural Society. It was held that plaintiff could not 
bring an action against the state. The accident took place, 
however, in 1891, two years before the passage of the consent 
statute relied upon by plaintiff in the present case. (Stats. 
1893, p. 57; now Gov. Code, § 16041.) Since it bad previously 
been held that the consent statute was not retroactive (Chap-
man v. 8tate, 104 Cal. 690, 693 [38 P. 457. 43 Am.St.Rep. 
158] ), the Melvin decision did not decide whether an action 
could be maintained thereunder (People v. Superior Court, 
supra,29 Cal.2d 754, 759; Talley v. Northern 8an Diego Hosp. 
Dist., ante, pp. 33, 36-37 [257 P.2d 22]) and. accordingly, 
is not controlling here. Defendant also relies on DiUwood 
v. Riecks (1919),42 Cal.App. 602 [184 P. 35]. There, plain-
tiff's horse was destroyed by a fire at a stable on county 
fairgrounds. through the negligence of county employees. 
Plaintiff contended that the county operated the fairgrounds 
in its proprietary capacity, relying upon 01wfor v. Oit" of 
) 
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Long Beach, supra, 174 Cal. 478. The court held that the 
county could not act in a proprietary capacity, on the ground 
that "counties being but agencies of the state, their functions 
are exclusively governmental and are such only as are im-
parted to them by the state." (42 Cal.App. at 608.) The 
Dillwood case is directly contrary to our decision in People 
Y. Superior Court, supra, 29 Ca1.2d 754, where we held that 
the state and, necessarily, its subdivisions, may act in a pro-
prietary capacity. (See, also, Muses v. Housing Authority, 
supra, 83 Cal.App.2d 489, 502.) The Dillwood case is dis-
approved insofar as it holds that counties may act only in a 
governmental capacity. 
In several cases municipal corporations either engaged in 
activities for the amusement and recreation of their citizens 
or allowed their property to be used for such purposes, and 
it was held that they acted in a proprietary capacity. Thus, 
in Chafor v. City of Long Beach, supra, 174 Cal. 478, the 
city authorized free use of the municipal auditorium by the 
Sons of St. George to celebrate Queen Victoria's birthday. 
The public was invited. A parade led by the municipal band 
terminated at the auditorium. The approach to the auditorium 
collapsed under the weight of the crowd seeking admission 
to attend further festivities. Similarly, in Sanders v. City 
of Long Beach, 54 Cal.App.2d 651 [129 P.2d 511], the same 
auditorium was used by the city to advertise itself and enter· 
tain the public during "Know Your City Week" by giving 
information concerning the various activities of departments 
of the city. Plaintiff was injured while attending motion. 
pictures at a room in the auditorium. Again, in Rhodes v. 
City of Palo Alto, 100 Cal.App.2d 336 [223 P.2d 639], the 
city recreotl.tion department operated a community theater 
in a public park for the entertainment of its citizens. Plain-
tiff was injured while attending the reading of a play at 
the theater. 
[4] In our opinion, the Chafor, Sanders, and Rhodes 
cases, supra, are controlling here, and require the conclusion 
that the state is acting in a proprietary capacity when it enters 
into activities at the state fair to amuse and entertain the 
public. The activities of defendants do not differ from those 
of private enterprise in the entertainment industry. As in 
People Y. Superior Court, supra, the state, by its agents, 
committed the tort while engaged in a proprietary activity, 
and the trial court therefore erred in concluding that the 
/ 
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oonsent statute did not allow maintenance of the action. The 
statements in Melvin v. State, supra, 121 Cal. 16, 22, indi-
cating that the State Agricultural Society engages in govern-
mental activities only in conducting the state fair are in-
consistent with the foregoing cases and are disapproved. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J .• and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
